Abstract. PBKDF2 [27] is a well-known password-based key derivation function. In order to slow attackers down, PBKDF2 introduces CPUintensive operations based on an iterated pseudorandom function (in our case HMAC-SHA-1). If we are able to speed up a SHA-1 or an HMAC implementation, we are able to speed up PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-1. This means that a performance improvement might be exploited by regular users and attackers. Interestingly, suggests that it is possible to precompute rst message block of a keyed hash function only once, store such a value and use it each time is needed [43] . Therefore the computation of rst message block does not contribute to slowing attackers down, thus making the computation of second message block crucial. In this paper we focus on the latter, investigating the possibility to avoid part of the HMAC-SHA-1 operations. We show that some CPU-intensive operations may be replaced with a set of equivalent, but less onerous, instructions. We identify useless XOR operations exploiting and extending Intel optimizations [26] , and applying the Boyar-Peralta heuristic [12] . In addition, we provide an alternative method to compute the SHA-1 message scheduling function and explain why attackers might exploit these ndings to speed up a brute force attack.
Introduction
When faced with the problem of accessing a protected resource, many applications ultimately rely on the knowledge of one or more secrets. Such secrets are commonly passwords or passphrases that can lead to a number of security issues. Firstly, giving the user the choice of selecting the secret to be used, usually results in a very humanly predictable secret being chosen. The user will most likely choose a short, and easy to remember, passphrase which might undermine the security of the system to be protected [14] , [39] , [7] , [19] . Secondly, passwordbased authentication can often be eectively attacked by employing techniques such as exhaustive search and dictionary attacks.
In order to avoid the use of user-chosen passwords as a key to cryptographic systems, a number of approaches have been developed. In particular, we are interested in password-based Key Derivation Functions, a set of algorithms which input a user-chosen password and provide a stream of pseudorandom bits presenting enough entropy and an adequate length to be used as key in real-world applications.
Password-based KDFs introduce CPU/memory intensive operations which avoid, or make dictionary and brute force attacks less feasible. At the same time, such operations are not so expensive to become a burden for a regular user.
In 2013, a Password Hashing Competition (PHC) [1] was held to develop a number of resistant password-based key derivation functions. PHC selected a winner (Argon2 [6] ) and gave a special recognition to four algorithms (Catena [18] , Lyra2 [40] , yescrypt [34] and Makwa [35] ). Although Argon2 is expected to be the password-based KDF of the next years, currently one of the most widely used functions is PBKDF2 [37] . Described by RSA Labs in PKCS#5 [37] , PBKDF2 has been implemented in several real-world applications such as WPA/WPA2 [25] , 1Password [2] If we are able to speed up SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-1, we are able to speed up PBKDF2. Interestingly, when the HMAC function is implemented without following the performance improvement described in [29] and [31] , it is possible to avoid 50% of PBKDF2's CPU intensive operations involved in the key derivation process. Moreover, as described in [41] , [43] and [38] , other critical aws might be exploited, thus reducing the total number of CPU-intensive operations to be performed for computing a key. Therefore, the only requirement to maintain security is to increase the number of computations through the iteration count parameter of PBKDF2.
In this paper, we describe an HMAC-SHA-1 optimization which can be used to speed up PBKDF2. Focusing on the computation of second message block of HMAC-SHA-1, we investigate the possibility to avoid part of the CPU-intensive operations by executing a set of equivalent, but less onerous, instructions. By doing so, we identify useless XOR operations exploiting and extending Intel optimizations [26] and applying the Boyar-Peralta heuristic [12] . In addition,
we provide an alternative method to compute the SHA-1 message scheduling function and explain why attackers might exploit these ndings to speed up a brute force attack against PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-1.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey The denition of HMAC [29] requires H: a cryptographic hash function; K: the secret key; text: the message to be authenticated.
As described in RFC 2104 [29] , an HMAC can be dened as follows:
where H is the chosen hash function, K is the secret key, ⊕ is the exclusive OR symbol, || is the concatenation symbol and ipad, opad are constant values respectively, the byte 0x36 and 0x5C repeated 64 times. In order to better understand Equation 1, we can expand it in the form:
In this paper we will refer to HMAC-SHA-1 which is the default as per [37] .
Therefore Equation 1 can be graphically represented as in Figure 1 .
Readers who are not familiar with SHA-1 may nd a detailed description of the cryptographic algorithm in [32] and [17] . However, it is worth recalling some 
This function requires to store eighty 32-bit words, therefore if memory is limited an alternative method should be adopted. 
where M ASK is set to the value 0000000f (in hex), thus performing arithmetic modulo 16. This new equation requires only sixteen words, thus saving sixty-four 32-bit words of storage.
PBKDF version 2
Password Based Key Derivation Function version 2, PBKDF2 for short, is a key derivation function published by RSA Laboratories in PKCS #5 [37] . In order to face brute force attacks based on weak user passwords, PBKDF2 introduces CPU-intensive operations. Such operations are based on an iterated pseudorandom function which maps input values to a derived key. PBKDF2 is fully dened by the following parameters:
a pseudorandom function (PRF) e.g. a hash function, cipher, or HMAC; an iteration count c; a password p; a salt s; a desired output length dkLen.
and outputs a derived key DK.
PBKDF2 can derive keys of arbitrary length. More precisely, PBKDF2 generates as many blocks T i as needed to cover the desired key length. Each block T i is computed iterating the PRF as many times as specied by an iteration count c. NIST suggests to select the iteration count as large as possible, however a minimum of 1,000 iterations is recommended for general purpose applications while 10,000,000 may be appropriate for protecting very critical keys [42] . The length of each block T i is bounded by hLen, which is the length of the underlying PRF output. This PRF can be a hash function [32] , cipher, or HMAC [4] , [5] , [29] .
Since the optimizations described in this paper only applies to HMAC-SHA-1, we use this HMAC as PRF.
PBKDF2 inputs a user password/passphrase p, a random salt s, an iteration counter c, and derived key length dkLen. It outputs a derived key DK.
The derived key is dened as the concatenation of dkLen/hLen -blocks:
where (see Figure 2 ) Avoiding useless XOR operations As shown in [41] , [43] and [38] , several performance improvements can be exploited to speed up the computation of PBKDF2 e.g., precomputing the rst message block of a keyed hash function, avoiding constant additions modulo 2 32 in the rst three rounds, avoiding SHA-1 length checks of input parameters, avoiding SHA-1 chunk splitting operations during the computation of U 2 ,. . . ,U c , and so on. In this section we present a new improvement. In particular, we show how useless operations, computed by HMAC-SHA-1 and repeated c times by PBKDF2, might be exploited by users (regular or malicious).
When the HMAC function is computed in a standard mode i.e., without following the performance improvements described in the implementation note of RFC 2104 [29] and FIPS 198-1 [31] attackers can precompute rst message block of a keyed hash function only once (green and orange rectangles in Figure   2 ), store such a value and use it each time is needed. This suggests that computation of the rst message block does not contribute to slowing down a brute force attack, thus the computation of second message block is crucial.
Therefore we focus on the second message block with the aim to show how users might avoid part of CPU-intensive operations involved in the key derivation process. Doing so, we will exploit and extend Intel optimizations [26] and the Boyar-Peralta heuristic [12] .
Exploiting Intel optimizations
As shown in [8] , the SHA-1 algorithm is a vastly parallel algorithm in terms of instruction level parallelism allowing it to fully employ several ALU pipelines but it seems like it is not well suited to work with Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions.
One of the most interesting optimizations to SHA-1 has been described by Max Locktyukhin in [26] . Improving an idea by Dean Gaudet [21] , the Intel 
As discussed in [43] , the second message block of a keyed hash function has a run of several consecutive zeros (red rectangle in Figure 2) 
Secondly, set i = i − A and compute W [i − A]:
Then repeat the same to i = i − B, i = i − C, and i = i − D getting:
Thirdly, substitute Equations 6, 7, 8, 9, in 5 obtaining:
Recalling that
ROT L
and X getting: 
. . .
where
, and so on. Again, we write the 64 rows of Equation 17 as a m × n matrix M over GF (2) and delete the columns which do not provide any contribution, thus getting a new sparse 64 × 107 matrix M .
Fourthly, nding the minimum number of XORs necessary to compute Equation 14 corresponds to the problem of nding a gate-optimal Boolean circuit that computes the linear systems 16 or 17. This problem is known to be a hard problem [10] [11], thus sub-optimal solutions can be computed applying polynomialor exponential-time heuristics e.g., [33] , [12] , and [44] . The Paar heuristic [33] usually performs well on large matrices but does not consider cancellation 1 over GF (2) . The Visconti-Schiavo-Peralta heuristic [44] considers cancellation over GF(2) but performs well on dense matrices. The Boyar-Peralta (BP ) heuristic [12] considers cancellation over GF (2) and works well with sparse matrices. Since both M and M are sparse, we can apply the BP heuristic to nd a small circuit that implements Equations 16 and 17. Unfortunately, we are not able to solve a large linear system due to the exponential time complexity of BP , thus applying BP to several sub-matrices of M and M with size smaller than 64 × 39 (that is the maximum allowed by our hardware). We repeat this point many times, choosing dierent sub-matrices and obtaining several circuits that implement the linear systems 16 and 17. Of course, at a cost of tripling the running time, one can also run [33] 
can be replaced with the following, and less expensive, equations: ). Therefore, this approach can be considered a valid alternative method for computing the SHA-1 message scheduling function in systems with tight memory constraints.
Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we show how performance improvements of SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-1 might be exploited to speed up a PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-1 implementation. In particular, we investigated the possibility to avoid part of the CPUintensive operations involved in the PBKDF2 computation by executing a set of equivalent, but less onerous, instructions. Since the computation of rst message block of HMAC-SHA-1 does not provide any contribution in slowing attackers down, we focused on the second message block, the only one able to slow them down. Exploiting and extending Intel optimizations and the Boyar-Peralta heuristic, we provide a new SHA-1 message scheduling function and showed that real-world applications to benchmark the userâs system and provide an appropriate level of security (e.g. LUKS), users can benet from such performance improvements. Therefore, it is important that these ndings are implemented in crypto libraries.
Moreover, there is a second way to gauge how interesting these results are. will be oset by the reduced number of cache misses which negatively aect the performance and the overall execution time of a brute force attack might be improved.
